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'Family banking in an era of crisis: N M  Rothschild & Sons and business in  
            central and eastern Europe between the World Wars'.  
 
In focussing on the business conducted by N M Rothschild & Sons in central 
and eastern Europe, this article analyses how the same family-specific 
characteristics that had  facilitated competitive advantages before 1914, 
exposed the house to dangerous pressures after 1918. The interwar years 
were critical as the family struggled to endure economic and financial 
turmoil and, especially, the ideological challenges of the 1930s. 
Nevertheless, the bank continued to support succession states such as 
Hungary - though the government became authoritarian and the economy 
subservient to the interests of Nazi Germany. The article examines how 
familial connections that spanned generations, humanitarian concerns and 
path dependency combined to influence business decisions and structure 
assessments of political risk. 
 
I 
Arguably, through history, the role of the family in the business of banking has been 
of signal importance.1 Throughout the nineteenth century, private banks exploited 
the competitive advantages to be gained from kinship ties and family friendships: 
transactions were underpinned by trust and shared values built up as a result of 
long-established relationships.2 Historians have begun to understand how significant 
such informal structures are in analysing the external relations of family businesses 
and their internal strategies.3 However, given the dominant position of family-run 
private banks in the development of international finance, further research is 
needed on the nature of their strengths and the timing and causes of their decline.4 
In analysing  the importance of the family in relation to these strengths and 
weaknesses, this article focuses on one firm that has survived -  N M Rothschild & 
Sons.  
 
When surveying the historical significance of banking families, no dynasty comes 
more readily to mind than that of the house of Rothschild: the London bank – N M 
Rothschild & Sons - continues to be successful in the marketplace. However, by 
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1918, several pressures seemed to foreshadow the demise of the business. In terms 
of the long-run survival of the bank, the interwar years were critical as the family 
struggled to endure economic and financial turmoil and, especially, the ideological 
challenges of the 1930s. Yet, apart from the historiography around the Credit-Anstalt 
crisis of 1931, little is known about the strategies adopted by the Rothschild family 
during these years. Niall Ferguson points out that the bond issues of the 1920s were 
among the most disastrous of modern times because of the years of crisis which 
followed. Certainly, the house of Rothschild was involved in lending to some of the 
most unstable regimes in the interwar years. According to Ferguson, ‘This was the 
unintended consequence of a rather uncritical resumption of pre-war patterns of 
business activity’.5  
 
However, in focussing on the underlying reasons and motivations for the business 
conducted by N M Rothschild & Sons in central and eastern Europe, the intention in 
this article is to argue that the patterns of pre-war lending were not resumed 
uncritically. It is the case that the same family-specific characteristics that had 
facilitated competitive advantages before 1914, exposed the London house to 
dangerous pressures after 1918. The bank enjoyed especially close relations with the 
Hungarian government and helped to secure League of Nations co-operation.  But, 
with the onset of the financial crisis, optimism gave way to fears of economic 
collapse and political disorder. Nevertheless, the bank continued to support Hungary 
throughout the 1930s - even as the government became more authoritarian and the 
economy subservient to the interests of Nazi Germany. The article examines how 
path dependency, and familial connections that spanned generations, combined 
with strong humanitarian concerns to influence business decisions and structure 
assessments of political risk. 
 
A recent study has theorised that a development, after 1918, of clusters of 
interlocking directorships among Britain's multinational business elite might have 
been a manifestation of an attempt to recapture commercial primacy in the face of 
the American challenge and global uncertainties. At the same time, it is 
acknowledged that among the social linkages that remain to be explored are marital 
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and family ties or services performed by company directors on behalf of 
government.6 Yet, family firms have frequently been held responsible for impeding 
modernization or even facilitating disasters. According to the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of 
capitalism, family control inhibits growth and innovation that comes with 
professional management and injections of external capital, whilst feuding may lead 
families to become periodically dysfunctional. Of particular relevance to a study of 
the Rothschilds in the interwar years is the theory that younger generations of a 
family need to discredit their forebears in order to see things differently and make 
necessary changes. In this respect, successful family firms are careful not to define 
their business as the business of origin.7 
 
However, some historians have challenged such interpretations: James, for example, 
has shown how the family firm is uniquely placed to mobilise social as well as 
financial capital and how family dynasties may represent a depth of tradition that 
fosters resilience, commitment and ultimately powerful ‘brands’.8 Social group 
affiliations and relationships, involving cultural factors related to race, religion, 
ethnicity and family, have all been important sources of entrepreneurial information 
and resources. Family-firm strategies may well be determined, therefore, by the 
environment in which the business operates.9 As a recent study points out, in the 
world of private banking, religion has formed an integral part – possibly more so 
than in any other economic activity. In the case of Jewish private bankers, financial 
success was partly attributable to the nature of their networks – rather than a 
question of religiosity, loyalty to Judaism was more a ‘clannish attitude’.10 For the 
Rothschilds, Judaism certainly formed an important part of an extended family 
identity and the business environment. At the same time, it is also claimed that 
research on ethnically-based influences on the business behaviour of a family 
dynasty is still in its infancy; as applying existing models of behaviour is problematic, 
the impact of such cultural differences may be overlooked.11   
 
There is little doubt that the succession states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire faced 
formidable challenges after the First World War. These included the break-up of 
internal markets and established communication channels, over-dependency on 
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inefficient agricultural sectors, and multiple tensions over the question of national 
minorities. With little in the way of domestic capital accumulation or foreign-
exchange resources, the economies of the states concerned looked to import capital. 
But the war also ruptured established financial relationships; ineluctably, the 
importance of London, Paris and New York as financial centres grew as that of 
Vienna declined.12    
 
While little was done at the inter-governmental level to support stabilisation, a 
number of ‘elite’ sub-state actors were involved in attempts to promote financial 
and economic reconstruction in Europe. Among these could be counted, for 
example, the financial experts acting under the auspices of the League of Nations.13 
Likewise, historians have focussed on the role of Montagu Norman, Governor of the 
Bank of England.14 By way of contrast with the rather controversial figure he became 
in the 1930s, Norman’s financial diplomacy in the years after the First World War has 
recently been portrayed as a dynamic, resourceful and passionate.15 Norman first 
became involved in east European affairs in April 1920; thereafter, with inflationary 
pressures mounting and economic collapse in prospect, he was active in attempts 
from 1921 to put together stabilisation loans for Austria, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary.  Philip Cottrell has convincingly argued that Norman’s cosmopolitan and 
internationalist background allowed him to develop a vision of central banking, even 
if the realisation of such ambitions was to be partially frustrated by domestic 
political constraints and nationalist rivalries in Europe. Yet, Cottrell also points out 
that the goals of Norman, and the cadre of experts surrounding him, included re-
establishing the City as the paramount centre for the world’s financial and economic 
systems.16  
 
This vision depended, therefore, on a network of financial interests that was wider 
than just those related to central banking. Until the First World War, private banks – 
especially Jewish ones - had been the pre-eminent influence on financial markets. In 
the interwar years, although joint-stock banks assumed a dominant position in the 
national markets of Europe’s industrialised countries, private banks retained a 
privileged position in penetrating the markets of less-developed countries. 17 Indeed, 
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given some of the difficulties involved in participating in share issues at home, 
London’s merchant banks looked to retain their international orientation as far as 
they possibly could.18 
In this context, N M Rothschild & Sons was to play a key role in attempting to 
promote financial and economic reconstruction in central and eastern Europe. The 
managing partners in the bank were Anthony de Rothschild and his brother Lionel de 
Rothschild; of the two, Anthony was more heavily involved in the business. 
Conducting international business during the interwar years involved the well-
established methods of informal intelligence-gathering based on a network of 
houses connected to the London Rothschilds (such as Warburgs, Schroders, Barings 
and the Rothschild banks in Vienna and Paris), and behind-the-scenes diplomacy as 
attempts were made to construct international syndicates. The London banks usually 
all participated, to a greater or lesser extent, in the various issues and in other 
business ventures. As for the Rothschild houses, while the cousins based in London, 
Paris and Vienna were linked by commonly-held financial interests, they appear to 
have involved themselves  in each other’s new business only to a very limited extent. 
 
It is curious, therefore, that relatively little is known about how City houses 
responded to the challenges that arose in the chaotic aftermath of the war. One 
study, by Ann Orde, looked at the involvement of Baring Brothers in the issue of the 
Czechoslovakian State Loan of 1922. On this basis, Orde concluded that, while the 
British authorities gave some consideration to British interests in the region in 
general, the vision of bankers was limited simply to looking for stability when making 
investment decisions.19 Furthermore, Derek Aldcroft has questioned just how 
responsible creditors were in their lending, when conditions began to improve from 
the mid 1920s, given that persistent structural problems made the servicing of 
external debt an ever-increasing burden.20 Altogether, it can hardly be said that 
bankers are portrayed in a flattering light in the relevant historiography.  
 
 
II 
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It is evident that from the first months of peace the representatives of the 
succession states looked as much to the City, and the renewal of pre-war business 
and financial relations, as they did to the British government for political support. In 
early December 1919, Edouard Benes, the Czechoslovakian prime minister, visited 
London; his purpose was to try to raise a loan. He made two visits to New Court – 
the premises of N M Rothschild & Sons in the City. Benes claimed that the British 
Government had told him that they were unable to help; but, apparently, they 
regarded his proposal very favourably and were prepared to say as much to any 
private bank that asked about it. The Czech politician astutely played on sensitivities 
over the impact of the war on the City’s pre-eminence in international finance: he 
informed the Rothschilds that the British government was anxious that the business 
should be done in London. Société Générale in Paris had already formed a syndicate 
of French banks and had made an agreement with a Czech bank syndicate and the 
Czech government.21  
 
When he visited Barings the following day, Anthony de Rothschild lost no time in 
bringing the potential business to the attention Lord Revelstoke. However, the desire 
to capture new business was tempered by the uncertainties surrounding the 
emergence of new political and economic structures in central and eastern Europe. 
Revelstoke agreed with Anthony that whilst the time was not opportune for an 
advance, they would have to make a start at some point. In the bewildering 
circumstances of the post-war world, bankers relied more than ever on trusted 
personal contacts – particularly those in official or semi-official positions - for 
guidance in assessing country-based risk. Lord Revelstoke pointed out that he was 
soon going to visit his friend, Sir George Clark, the British minister in Prague. This 
provided a good opportunity to find out what Clark’s opinion was of the stability and 
integrity of the Czechoslovakian government. It also allowed New Court, in the 
meantime, to find out whether the British government was really favourably 
disposed towards the Czechoslovakian proposals. The security for the loan depended 
on sugar exports. If the arrival of the sugar could have been guaranteed, Barings 
would have happily joined with New Court on a small scale. The same undoubtedly 
applied to Schroders. But, as Frank Tiarks, the leading partner, reminded the 
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Rothschilds, in the absence of other collateral the three houses were not able to do 
anything until the sugar was actually out of the ground.22   
 
Assessments of how well endowed the succession states were with natural and 
other resources helped to determine, in general, the attitude taken by the City 
towards loans to the whole region. Anthony visited the Foreign Office in order to 
affirm that the bank would act entirely in conformity with the policy of the 
government. The problem was that there was no clear and settled policy. Attitudes 
to the defeated powers were, understandably, hostile. Led by the so-called New 
Europe group around Seton-Watson, there was a special loathing of the Magyars. To 
set against this, more objective minds in the Foreign Office realised that without an 
economically stable Austro-Hungary, Bolshevism was likely to spread.  British policy 
was also predicated on the assumption that the Danubian states would, of necessity, 
have to develop some form of economic reintegration and that this would override 
fissiparous nationalist tendencies. Equally, it was highly undesirable that the door 
should be left wide open for the French or even the Italians to become the dominant 
commercial power. But beyond this, the British government seemed uncertain over 
whether any vital British interests were involved in the region at all and, from the 
mid-1920s, Britain began step by step to disengage diplomatically from the affairs of 
central and eastern Europe. Against the advice of Sir George Clark, the harsh 
conditions of the Treaty of Trianon were imposed on Hungary. The consequences 
included irredentism, economic weakness, and national humiliation. Worse still, in 
the aftermath of the Financial Crisis in 1931, authoritarian traditions were to give 
rise to a new form of nationalist dictatorship.23 
  
After the First World War, the British Treasury, rather than Foreign Office, exercised 
the greatest influence in determining policy over matters of international finance 
and, in eyes of the former, Benes had clearly overstated his case. The Treasury was 
anything but ebullient over the condition of the Czechoslovakian economy. Shortly 
before Christmas 1919, a Treasury official called at New Court and informed Anthony 
de Rothschild that the government was not prepared to give any guarantees. 
Czechoslovakia already owed Britain a considerable amount of money; repayment 
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based on coal exports to Austria had been promised, but a shortage of trucks had 
prevented deliveries. The Treasury held the depressing view that if Czechoslovakia 
had any assets to offer, it would have already offered them to Britain in settlement 
of debts.   As the Foreign Office noted in correspondence with New Court at the 
beginning of 1920, for as long as the Treasury maintained an unfavourable attitude 
towards such proposals, no official encouragement could be given.24 
 
Nevertheless, there was a nexus of interests that bound together the City and the 
British authorities. Perhaps for that reason, the bankers were undeterred from 
exploring other schemes. In the spring of 1920, it was the turn of a delegation of 
Viennese businessmen to visit the City. At 12, Tokenhouse Yard, the offices of 
Frederick Huth & Co., they met Sir Thomas Cuninghame, the British military 
representative in Vienna, and Sir William Beveridge, the prominent civil servant, 
both of whom had recently returned from Austria. There was general agreement 
that the conditions in Austria, though bad, were not hopeless. The sense of the 
meeting at Huths was that the key to improvement lay in re-establishing relations 
between Austria and the succession states. A large-scale trading organisation, to be 
set up simultaneously in Vienna and Prague, was proposed.25  
 
The London Rothschilds, along with Frederick Goodenough, chairman of Barclays 
Bank, were involved in drawing up this scheme. Humanitarian concerns over the 
general level of economic distress and the impoverished condition of much of the 
population weighed heavily. Writing to Baron Louis Rothschild, his cousin in Vienna, 
Anthony expressed the hope that trade with Britain would be facilitated and, 
thereby, the first step would be taken towards alleviating the unfortunate condition 
of Vienna and Austria. Although the initiative would have to come from central 
Europe, Anthony was,  
 
‘quite sure that there is much goodwill here and that there are many Bankers 
and Merchants in England who would gladly render assistance if they were 
satisfied that it would ultimately be for the general benefit of all 
concerned’.26  
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In pursuit of these objectives, Huths advised New Court, at the end of March 1920, 
that a company had been formed – the Anglo-Danubian Association. N M Rothschild 
& Sons were allocated shares as part of a syndicate of City houses. A precedent had 
been set a few months earlier when British interests had bought up a controlling 
share of various shipping companies on the Danube to form the British River 
Syndicate Ltd. The British navy controlled the Danube and this provided an 
opportunity to project commercial interests as a counter to French political influence 
and control of railways.27 
 
Colonel George Schuster was appointed to conduct an investigation into the 
economic prospects of the region. The syndicate was also looking for reliable 
information on the various local firms that were anxious to deal with the City. 
Schuster set off, therefore, bearing letters of introduction from the London 
Rothschilds to their cousins in both Paris and Vienna. They were asked to provide 
Schuster with reliable information on the character of the relevant firms and 
especially whether they were trustworthy and credit-worthy.28   
 
Schuster reported in July 1920 on the general economic conditions. He recognised 
that all the political dangers provided arguments against locking up large sums in 
central Europe. To set against this, the existence of such dangers in itself argued 
strongly in favour of taking any preventative action which was possible. However, 
the report concluded, it was not reasonable to expect a private group to take the 
risks; what was needed was some form of under-writing by government. Schuster 
believed that the best hope lay in the intervention of a group like the Anglo-
Danubian, as opposed to the activities of what he took to be bargain hunters and 
speculators on the one hand, and political-commercial groups – such as the French 
one – on the other.29 
 
Very little came of these aspirations. A small company was formed in August 1920 to 
take over the activities of the Anglo-Danubian and to act as agents and security-
holders for those interested. While N M Rothschild & Sons remained willing to 
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examine any business that was proposed, they took the view that prevailing political 
conditions made it unlikely that they would be anything other than passive 
shareholders in the new company.     
 
Indeed, the problems besetting the former territories of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire were multiple and inter-related. The new national economies could not be 
constructed without external financial support. But, for as long as the region 
remained utterly depressed and politically unstable, private bankers in London, Paris 
and New York found it difficult to see how the capital markets would ever gain the 
confidence to invest. Furthermore, the Allied Powers were beginning to learn how 
the imposition of reparations made attempts at economic reconstruction vastly 
more difficult and thereby reduced the chances that any initiatives would be 
successful. Little progress could be made without the intervention of some form of 
agency at national or international level.  This was the outlook when Sir Ernest 
Harvey, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, called at New Court in September 
1920. Harvey had recently served as financial adviser to the Reparations Commission 
in Vienna; he was trying to develop a scheme for a central bank in Vienna that would 
have international shareholders and certain guarantees from the Commission. But 
New Court believed that it would be difficult to go forward with a public subscription 
before an economic recovery had taken place.30 At the beginning of November 1921, 
Anthony recorded that Lionel and he called at Barings for a friendly conversation 
over the question of examining Czechoslovakian finance.31 This led, eventually, to 
the issuing of the Czech State Loan of 1922. 
 
This brought forward the question of whether it would be possible to raise a similar 
loan for Austria. In May 1922, N M Rothschild & Sons, Barings and Schroders, in 
conjunction with Morgan, Grenfell – acting on behalf of JP Morgan – made an initial, 
but unsuccessful, attempt to find a basis on which a loan might be made to the 
Austrian government. However, the consortium told the minister at the Austrian 
legation in London that they were deeply impressed with the importance to Austria 
of such an operation and that, so desirous were they of being of some service, they 
accepted the invitation to send a representative to Vienna. This task was undertaken 
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by Young, of the Anglo-Ősterreichische Bank, during June 1922. A few signs of 
political stabilisation were emerging with the formation of a new government. Yet, 
what clearly impressed Young the most was the ‘crisis of despair’. Reporting from 
the Austrian Bundeskanzlei, he declared that the position was very grave indeed, and 
one which required the intervention of Allied governments. He hoped that some 
combination could be found to avert the serious political consequences which would 
follow any break-up of Austria.32  
 
The next month, the Governor of the Bank of England was informed of the group’s 
decision not to proceed. Nothing more could be done until, following the Geneva 
Protocols, a League of Nations scheme was proposed in October 1922. But the 
bankers were still kept waiting on the politicians. On 15 December, Grenfell rang 
New Court to say that he had just lunched with the Governor; the latter passed on 
the information that nothing could be done until other countries had given the 
necessary authorisation for the guarantees. Nor had anything been settled over 
which banks should undertake the issue of the proposed loan.33 
 
Consequently, partners from the same group of City banks assembled at the Bank of 
England in January 1923 to reconsider the League plan for Austria. Also present at 
the meeting were Sir Otto Niemeyer, representing the Treasury, and Sir Henry 
Strakosch, Deputy Governor. Yet, the City was conscious that an international loan 
required some support, at least, in New York if the issue was to have any chance of 
being a successful one. But in the eyes of American investors the Austrian proposals 
were contingent on developments in the situation of Germany. JP Morgan 
telegraphed from New York to confirm that the general feeling was one of very great 
discouragement over the position of central Europe. It was quite simply futile to 
discuss the possibility of an Austrian issue with the distributing houses.34 
 
But, curiously, JP Morgan were simply reiterating what the Bank of England had 
already told Thomas Lamont, the leading partner in the American firm, when he had 
visited London in May 1922. It had been Lamont, at the behest of the Austrian 
authorities, who had initiated discussions over the idea of a loan. But the Bank had 
12 
 
carefully explained that, even with the best will in the world, American participation 
would not be possible given the condition of the Ruhr – occupied by France - and 
central Europe. 
 
Lamont, according to Henry Davidson, a fellow partner, was quite clear about the 
reasons for a difference in outlook between the London banks and those in New 
York: in the case of the former, almost all had long-standing and valuable 
connections in Vienna and Austria which it was wise for them to conserve and 
protect. Moreover, Lamont acknowledged, London had the leadership of the Bank of 
England whereas the Federal Reserve Bank was unable by law even to take an 
interest in such matters. In the words of Davidson, ‘the appeal to the New York 
banking fraternity generally had to be made almost solely on humanitarian 
grounds.’35 It seems very unlikely, however, that appeals to American investors to 
show generosity of spirit would have achieved very much unless, at the same time, a 
healthy rate of return on capital could also be guaranteed. 
 
 
III 
As attempts to act in support of Austria stalled so, in the course of 1922-23, 
attention began to focus on Hungary’s need for financial support. As with Austria, 
Norman attached the highest importance to achieving reconstruction and 
stabilisation. But Budapest remained deeply hostile to the territorial settlement that 
the peace had imposed and, furthermore, any loan proposal had to take the 
question of reparations into consideration. N M Rothschild & Sons had been 
responsible for issuing, in 1914, the last Hungarian loan. New Court was approached 
in March 1923 by a London-based business agency with contacts in Hungary with a 
request to consider a new loan. Large British engineering firms, such as Vickers, were 
apparently declining business as payment in sterling could not be obtained in 
reasonable time. Although initially cautious, in a matter of weeks Anthony had 
handed Sir William Goode, financial adviser to the Hungarian government, a 
proposal to be taken to the authorities in Budapest.36 But with the political and 
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economic crisis in Germany continuing, and American sentiments unchanged, no 
headway could be made over Hungary either.  
 
On 14 March 1924, a further set of protocols was signed at Geneva, this time for the 
financial reconstruction of Hungary. Hopes were raised that an international loan 
consortium could be put together. New Court’s associates in the US were Kuhn, Loeb 
& Co. This bank, second only in size to J.P. Morgan, was highly influential as an 
intermediary in such international issues.37 But in May 1924, Kuhn, Loeb confirmed 
that they agreed with JP Morgan: in the absence of governmental guarantees and 
the disinclination of the American public, the prospects for a loan were not 
favourable. The only possibility to enlist American co-operation was to base an 
appeal on ‘grounds of needed helpfulness’ and combine the efforts of the leading US 
houses. Yet even then, Kuhn, Loeb told New Court, the investment climate was so 
much more favourable in the US than in central Europe that it represented an 
‘immovable element’ in the way of a new loan – however regrettable that was from 
the point of view of America’s own interest and the economic equilibrium of the 
world.38 Ironically, what appeared to be immovable in terms of the international 
outlook was very soon thereafter swept away when the Dawes Plan allowed a flood 
of American credits to enter the German market. Furthermore, as the onset of 
Depression was to reveal, the unstable nature of such lending helped to undermine 
yet further the economic equilibrium of the global system. 
 
On 14 June 1924, the Council of the League adopted a resolution notifying the 
Reparations Committee that it undertook the responsibility of completing the 
Hungarian reconstruction plan contained in the Geneva Protocols. Two days later, 
the Governor wrote formally to Anthony in order to pass on confirmation from 
Niemeyer – in Geneva – that this made definite the release of Hungarian assets from 
Reparations liens. The way was now open to raise a loan. But, without support from 
across the Atlantic, placing such a loan was always going to be an uphill struggle. The 
issue stood at risk of turning into a flop. Unlike the Czechoslovakian State Loan, the 
Hungarian scheme carried no governmental guarantees. In the event, the market – 
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mostly through N M Rothschild & Sons, Barings and Schroders - took up just under 
£8 million when the issue was floated in July 1924.39 
 
Although the purpose of the loan was to enable the Hungarian government to 
balance its budget, it seems that the cause of stabilisation was hardly advanced. One 
historian is struck by the discrepancy between the positive short-term 
accomplishment of sound money and the lack of progress achieved in the region’s 
economy. The greater part of the loan was used on the due amortisation instalments 
of old debts, the bureaucracy and non-productive building projects. The loan was 
‘political’ in the sense that it bolstered the prestige of the regime. It also encouraged 
a dependency culture of relying on external financial support.40 By 1928, new foreign 
lending was insufficient to cover the annual repayment of Hungarian debt.41 
 
The second half of the 1920s was, of course, a period of optimism in international 
affairs and foreign lending took place on a scale that appeared, in retrospect, to be 
reckless. But the First World War had brought a succession of shattering and 
bewildering events which were without precedent and many in the City, as 
elsewhere, desperately wanted to see a return to something like the conditions that 
had prevailed in 1914. N M Rothschild & Sons, however, does not appear to have 
been anything other than conservative and orthodox in its approach. Corresponding 
at the end of 1924 with Paul Warburg, who was then based in New York, Anthony 
described how the British authorities were seeking to encourage the appreciation of 
sterling to a level where it got back to the point of its gold value. He understood 
Bank of England and Treasury policy to be one of dissuading all reputable firms in the 
City from making public issues to raise money for use in foreign countries. Naturally, 
there was a certain amount of impatience with this policy. But it didn’t apply to 
commercial credits. Anthony commented that the City was doing a considerable 
amount of this type of business with the continent – especially with Germany – 
although ‘with competition from your side the rates of commission are no longer so 
tempting’.42  
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While reports reaching New Court of Austria’s continuing difficulties made 
depressing reading, the news from Hungary appeared in contrast to be very 
satisfactory. For one member of the Rothschild family in Britain - Rozsika von 
Wertheimstein – any positive news from Hungary was something to be exploited. 
Rozsika was part of the preceding generation of family bankers and, in this sense, 
was an embodiment of the ‘long view’. A wealthy Hungarian baroness with Jewish 
ancestry, she had married Charles Rothschild, a partner in the bank, in 1907. She 
took an active interest in international politics. As the London Rothschilds moved 
closer during the First World War towards supporting Zionism, she became an 
enthusiast for the cause.43 Tragically, in 1923, when he was aged 46, Charles 
committed suicide. Rozsika represented a link, therefore, to the period before the 
First World War – an era which was looked back upon as a golden age for merchant 
banking in general and for the house of Rothschild in particular.  
 
Writing to New Court, in late 1926, from her home in Tring, Rozsika deftly but 
powerfully defended Hungary and Hungarians against their British-based detractors. 
It was a painful irony that newspaper articles on Hungary were written from Vienna 
and influenced by a large émigré community - mostly brilliant young Jews - who 
were connected in some way or the other with the previous two regimes. Rozsika 
realised that compared to English standards there was not as much political freedom 
under the government led by Count Bethlen, the Prime Minister, as one would have 
wished. Yet, for a country that had gone through a revolution, a Bolshevik regime, a 
counter-revolution, occupation by Rumania, and a White Terror - not to speak of a 
lost war - she found it astonishing how improved economic conditions were in 
Hungary given these ideological upheavals. Rozsika maintained that the dividing line 
in Hungary between Socialism and Bolshevism was not as clearly defined as it was in 
Britain and that to fear the spectre of communism was, therefore, hardly 
nonsensical. At the same time, she dismissed the supposed tyranny of the right: ‘It is 
worse than absurd to speak of a war like regime with an army of 35,000 men!’ 44 
 
Nothing suggests that the two Rothschild brothers felt able to resist the emotional 
pull of family traditions, even if they had wanted to remain entirely objective in their 
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assessments of where sound business opportunities lay. In this respect, it may be 
instructive to consider what studies of family businesses with different culturally-
specific characteristics have revealed about patterns of behaviour. In Asian family 
businesses, for example, decision-making that may determine long-term strategy is 
influenced by not only by members of the family who are actively involved, but also 
by those who are not – such as leading female members.45 Anthony and Lionel  
clearly understood the significance of the historical connection between the 
Rothschilds and central Europe. This was, after all, why New Court had been 
approached first with a proposal for a new loan to Hungary. For reasons of tradition, 
and because of long-standing connections and familial influence, New Court 
remained supportive of the new Hungarian state. Yet, at the same time, this did not 
mean that the business looked to be anything other than promising. The bank acted 
as principal agent for the 1926 Counties of Hungary bond issue which raised £2.25 
million. In the second half of the decade N M Rothschild & Sons was involved in 
various schemes to raise finance for the development of Hungary’s industrial 
infrastructure, particularly activity related to the electrification of the railways. This 
was also of considerable interest to British manufacturers of power-generation 
equipment, such as Metropolitan-Vickers. 
 
At the beginning of the following decade, protracted and delicate negotiations 
commenced over a proposed long-term Hungarian State Loan; N M Rothschild & 
Sons, as with the League issue of 1924, took the lead. But the timing of the proposal 
was hardly propitious and negotiations became mired in difficulties. While the 
London authorities were sympathetic to the idea of extending support to Hungary, 
the Bank of England gave priority to the marketing of the Young bonds. At the same 
time, the delay in ratifying the Hague Agreement threw up legal complications which 
were only resolved when the Hungarians were granted dispensation by the Paris-
based Reparations Commission. Furthermore, with the effects of the Depression 
hitting commodity prices, conditions in Hungary deteriorated sharply. As a result, a 
loan was finally floated towards the end of 1930, but in a much reduced form.  
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Nonetheless, it allowed City bankers to claim that it was the prelude to a more 
ambitious programme that would be of material assistance in the stabilisation of 
Europe. Furthermore, there was satisfaction that the leadership of the international 
group had been entrusted to London.46  The links between New Court and Hungary 
were strengthened further when, at the request of Rozsika and the Hungarian 
government, Anthony agreed to be appointed as Honorary Consul General in 
London.47  
 
In March 1931, consideration was given to the idea of another international loan. 
Samuel Stephany, manager of N M Rothschild & Sons, visited Speyer and Company, 
in New York, and informed London that this American bank believed the bond 
market was sufficiently improved to make a new Hungarian loan possible. An issue 
totalling a sum of up to $30 million was thought possible, particularly if Paris could 
be persuaded to participate as this would have helped to create a favourable 
investment climate on both sides of the Atlantic. At the request of H.A. Siepmann, at 
the Bank of England, and at the invitation of the Hungarian Government, Per 
Jacobsen, from the newly-established Bank for International Settlements, visited 
Budapest in March and April 1931 to investigate the budget position. Jacobsen was 
accompanied by Charles Gunston, a Bank of England official. The subsequent report 
attached great importance to the ability of Hungary to dispose of sufficient funds for 
investment. As Count Bethlen, in Budapest, pointed out to New Court on 9th May, 
an early and satisfactory settlement of a new loan, already pending for several years, 
was especially necessary in times of economic difficulties.48 
 
 
IV 
But such optimism must have suddenly seemed to be greatly misplaced: it was 
precisely at this point that the extent of the losses of the Credit-Anstalt in Vienna, 
the most important bank in central Europe, was announced to the public. With a loss 
of investor confidence spreading like a contagion, the rapid and shocking onset of 
the financial crisis revealed the fragility of the international system. All hopes of 
reconstruction in Europe gave way to the fear of economic collapse and political 
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disorder. The Credit-Anstalt had been founded in the mid-nineteenth century by the 
Rothschilds, and the family had remained closely associated with the bank. Any 
failure of this institution would have represented, therefore, the biggest possible risk 
to Rothschild investments collectively and to the reputation of the family name.  If 
the ties linking the Rothschild houses in London, Paris and Vienna became looser 
after the First World War, the Credit-Anstalt crisis strained relations between the 
cousins to the point of rupture. The events of the summer of 1931 heralded the 
beginning of the years of crisis – a time of acute anxiety for those who were running 
N M Rothschild & Sons.49  
 
In June 1931, Anthony travelled to Paris to meet his cousins, Edouard, Robert and 
James, at de Rothschild Frères, in Rue Laffitte. The Paris house was eager, perhaps 
too eager, to stress that discussions over a rescue plan were based merely on a 
hypothetical case and that there was absolutely no question of putting any such plan 
into operation. As they put it in a letter to Lionel de Rothschild, in sole charge at New 
Court, 'We only wanted to know whether, and how, in case of emergency, we might 
directly, or rather indirectly, be momentarily helped out'.50  
 
After he left Paris, Anthony went back over New Court's records to conduct a post-
mortem on the bad business - though the Credit-Anstalt was supported rather than 
wound up. The London house had expressed its uneasiness to Vienna when, in 1929, 
the Boden Credit Anstalt had been absorbed by the Credit-Anstalt. Anthony blamed 
himself for not persisting at the time with his questioning of this take-over. But he 
had no doubt that the source of their troubles lay in the behaviour of their cousin, 
Louis, in Vienna. New Court had received reassuring statements and explanations 
which it felt obliged to accept as satisfactory. Anthony did not conceal from his Paris 
cousins his extreme frustration over how he had been treated. As late as October 
1930,  Louis had been reassuring the family that he was completely satisfied with the 
position of the Credit-Anstalt: the bank was becoming more liquid and the 
absorption of the Boden Credit Anstalt was proceeding more rapidly and successfully 
than could have been expected. Reflecting on the sorry episode, Anthony considered 
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that 'The only charitable explanation is that all parties concerned deluded 
themselves with a facile optimism'.51 
 
If anything, Anthony's bemusement increased when he travelled to Vienna and, in 
accordance with the wishes of his cousins in Paris, devoted himself entirely to 
arranging with Louis the conditions of the advance that was being made to the 
Viennese house and to the task of preventing Louis from giving way to depression. 
Anthony told his Paris cousins that he was much impressed with the extraordinary 
mentality which existed: 'It seems never to have occurred to Louis that he ought to 
have kept London and Paris fully informed.' On the contrary, Louis had thought it 
best not be in close touch in order not to implicate the other Rothschild houses. 
Even at this point, no explanation of the Credit-Anstalt troubles was forthcoming; 
rather, Louis appeared to suggest that they were the result of world conditions and 
to have accepted the crisis as something inevitable. As for the losses suffered by the 
Viennese house, these were thought to amount to no less than £9.75 million - 
incurred, it seemed likely, over a period longer than just the preceding few weeks. 
Baron Louis and his two brothers considered themselves ruined. Anthony demurred 
from this assessment. At the same time, he did not believe that the cousins in Vienna 
appreciated the extent of the sacrifices which they were calling on the rest of the 
family to make. This was exemplified by a request by Louis for a £250,000 credit for 
the Witkowitz iron and steel works. Anthony remarked, somewhat bitterly, that one 
would have thought that every effort would have been made to avoid the necessity 
for this in view of everything that had happened.52 
 
As the loss of confidence among international investors spread to London, 
correspondence between New Court and Rue Laffitte also provides a rare insight 
into the traumatic effects of the Financial Crisis on the City's banking community. 
The panic-induced capital flight that took place in the summer weeks of 1931 
brought several City banking houses to the edge of collapse. It seems likely that New 
Court was not so badly hit as some institutions.53 Nevertheless, shortly before Britain 
left the Gold Standard, Anthony informed Paris that a large proportion of the foreign 
balances which had been held by N M Rothschild & Sons at call or at short notice had 
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been taken away. Nearly every other institution in London was in the same position. 
Anthony could not say what remained in London in the shape of time deposits and it 
was too soon to know whether any foreign money would remain as a result of the 
formation of the National Government.54 
 
On 23 June 1931, Bethlen pleaded with Goode to persuade the British and 
Americans not to withdraw their short-term credits from Hungary.55 Lending to 
Germany - if on a much larger scale - and to Austria gave rise to the same urgent 
need, with the result that the international credits extended to those countries were 
maintained under the so-called Standstill Agreements. On behalf of the League of 
Nation's Financial Committee, Niemeyer urged the bankers to support the same 
arrangements for Hungary; the alternative, he warned, was a complete transfer 
moratorium.  Budapest was hard put to make interest payments and, in Niemeyer's 
view, it was a chimera to suppose that any maturing capital sums could be repaid for 
many months to come, even with the greatest conceivable improvement in the trade 
balance.56 An Hungarian Committee was formed, as a sub-committee of the British 
Short Term Creditors Committee, with representation from N M Rothschild & Sons, 
Lloyds, the British Overseas Bank, and Kleinworts.  With total acceptances 
amounting to some £135,000 and a total of £80,000 committed to loans and 
advances, New Court's commitments in this respect were not especially problematic. 
But, as N M Rothschild & Sons acted as the financial agent of the Hungarian 
government, it was natural that Anthony should become chairman of the sub-
committee of short-term creditors. Unfortunately, this was to place him in the eye of 
furious transatlantic storm  that blew up at the beginning of 1932. 
 
There were several factors that complicated negotiations over Hungary's short-term 
credits and, in contrast to the discussions that led to the other Standstill 
Agreements, quickly created an acrimonious atmosphere. A consortium of British, 
European and American banks had issued tranches of Hungarian Treasury bills in 
November 1930. Just as these were about to mature at the end of November 1931, 
the Hungarian government despatched Baron Koranyi, the Finance Minister, to 
London to inform New Court that Budapest was about to announce a transfer 
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moratorium. The bankers were effectively presented with a forced renewal of the 
bills.57  
In these circumstances, the bankers in London refused to begin negotiations for a 
Standstill. On hearing this, an incensed Niemeyer told the bankers that their attitude 
was injudicious. But the American bankers completely sympathised with their British 
counterparts. Goodhue, of the International Acceptance Bank in New York, insisted 
that the League should recognise its moral responsibility to Hungary in order to 
control the country's fiscal affairs and to protect international banking interests. 
America would then, Goodhue thought, be willing to participate in the Standstill 
negotiations. 
Niemeyer reacted furiously. He asked Anthony whether he could disabuse Goodhue 
of his extremely ignorant notions. Apart from one or two technical matters, the 
responsibility - moral or otherwise -  of the League for Hungary had ceased with 
decontrol in 1927. At the same time, Niemeyer declared that nobody took a more 
emphatic view of the moral responsibilities of the League than he did, though he did 
not always find that the same views were held in London banking circles. Niemeyer 
rejected the idea that the League should represent Hungary's creditors, especially as 
they had continued to lend money after Jeremiah Smith's warning in 1927 that 
Hungary should not borrow too much abroad. In turn, the American banks blamed 
Niemeyer. In their view, the system of exchange controls and priorities which had 
been set up in Hungary with the co-operation of Niemeyer and the League's Finance 
Committee had brought about the virtual paralysis of Hungarian foreign trade and 
the drying up of the sources of foreign exchange.58  
The divisions between bankers and the financial authorities in London and Geneva 
widened still further in February 1932. At issue was the question of discrimination 
between the different classes of loans. It was clear that the service of the League 
Loan of 1924 and of the American Relief Bonds took priority. But the Hungarian 
Treasury bondholders suddenly learnt that the service of the $20.8 million loan 
granted by the Bank of International Settlements to the National Bank of Hungary, at 
an interest rate of 8 per cent, would also receive priority. The Hungarian Treasury 
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bondholders saw no reason why they, as private bankers, should agree to wait for 
their interest to be paid if the BIS adhered to such a policy of discrimination.  
But Goode pleaded with the London bankers, if on no other grounds than in the 
bigger interests of world recovery, to show the lead that was just then so badly 
needed. If Hungary was a relatively small link in the chain of international credit, it 
was a link nonetheless. Goode, in common with many in the western democracies, 
believed that nothing less than the ideological basis of an entire way of life was at 
stake. He wrote: 'The survival of capitalism must in a great degree depend on the 
continuity of credit and the recovery of purchasing power.'59 The British committee 
finally signed a Standstill Agreement on 14th March 1932. But no agreement was 
reached with any of the other foreign creditors. In practice, the policy of 
discriminating between types of lending came to nothing as there was insufficient 
foreign exchange in Hungary to meet even the monthly requirements of the League 
loan.60 
 
The effect of the Great Depression and Financial Crisis on Hungary was severe. 
Moreover, the evolving character of the commitment by N M Rothschild & Sons to 
support Hungary bears witness to the close association between the adverse 
consequences of the financial crisis and the rise of political extremism and fascism in 
Europe in the 1930s. Just before Britain suspended the gold standard in September 
1931, Sir William Goode predicted that as a result of the crisis, central and eastern 
Europe would be plunged into chaos. He warned Ramsay MacDonald, the British 
Prime Minister: 'Perhaps I am over-pessimistic as to the imminence of European 
collapse, but my knowledge of financial conditions there impels me to warn you 
most seriously of the danger that exists - as great as that in 1920 when I reported to 
the Cabinet as Director of Relief in Europe.'  Without the operation of a scheme 
similar to the one that helped to relieve the suffering in the aftermath of the First 
World War, Goode couldn't see how social order was to be maintained across 
Europe.61 
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Confirmation that Hungary was on the point of collapse came from Baron Koranyi, 
the Finance Minister, at the end of May 1932. He compared the country's position to 
that which had prevailed in the 15th century when Europe had been beset with 
rivalries and had allowed the Turks to invade and ruin the Danubian countries for 
centuries. Koranyi declared that the Great Powers had to 'understand that if a 
political and economic plague kills us here, the same epidemy will ruin them too'.62 
 
Though Hungary did not collapse in any formal sense, the country's political 
institutions were fatally undermined and the government became progressively 
more authoritarian. The reports reaching New Court must have made depressing 
reading. One banker, after a visit to Hungary in late 1933, noted that, contrary to 
expectations, General Gőmbős, the new Prime Minister, had not quite turned out to 
be a dictator. On the other hand, his methods of establishing a very firm government 
were hardly democratic: the visiting banker noted that Gőmbős seemed to get on 
very well by more or less 'eliminating parliamentary interference'.63 It was difficult 
for western bankers to see behind the scenes of the small, aristocratic clique that 
had traditionally governed Hungary. But, by the mid-1930s, there was no doubt that 
the regime established by Gőmbős, who belonged to Regent Horthy's inner circle of 
friends, had become fascist and anti-semitic in character. As one observer put it, the 
regime was more or less a dictatorship dependent on the army and high aristocracy. 
To make matters worse, especially for the Rothschilds, Gőmbős was thought by all to 
be pro-German.64 After his death in 1936, Hungary was drawn ever closer into 
Germany’s economic orbit.65 
 
 
V 
In many respects, as Youssef Cassis comprehensively demonstrates, during the 
interwar years London still had some claim to be the world’s leading financial centre. 
Similarly, change in the City’s institutional structures was anything but radical. 
Although the merchant banks were forced to share the acceptance market with the 
big banks, they were still able to mobilise the advantages they enjoyed over their 
bigger rivals in the London market for foreign issues. In general, these advantages 
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included an highly-developed network of political and business relationships both at 
home and abroad, and expertise in dealing with complex questions of international 
finance - one of the legacies of the First World War.66 The bewildering conditions in 
the years following the First World War, confronted all banking businesses with a 
challenging climate of highly increased uncertainty and political risk. 
 
In this respect, the evidence suggests that the role of City houses in attempting to 
reconstruct central and eastern Europe – and particularly the role of the London 
Rothschilds – has been somewhat obscured and the motivation of bankers 
misinterpreted. The primary purpose of financial institutions is, naturally enough, to 
make money. But it is hardly correct to assume that bankers were in no sense 
mindful of wider responsibilities, nor that they would have preferred to turn away 
from the grave difficulties confronting the birth of the new Europe.  
 
In the case of the Rothschilds, familial affiliations and traditions were especially 
important influences in determining where responsibilities lay and how 
entrepreneurial decisions were measured against political risk. At the same time, the 
decisions N M Rothschild & Sons took over business in central and eastern Europe 
were not simply the product of path dependency: the house was well informed 
about political and economic developments and took such considerations into 
account when evaluating the relevant risks. In November 1926, one of the younger, 
but upcoming, members of the Warburg family - Siegmund - wrote to Lionel and 
Anthony to thank them for his recent stay in London: 
 
‘I learnt something also which will be far more important to me in my future 
life. This is the fine tradition of New Court which combines business with 
humanity, without neglecting either.’67 
 
But, if there was a degree of continuity in banking practices and structures before 
and after the First World War, the environment in which international banking 
operated was to change fundamentally after 1929.  The nature of such change  - 
brought about by economic crisis and  political extremism - could scarcely have been 
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predicted or even imagined in 1918-19. With the onset of the Depression, business 
in central and eastern Europe was to come at a considerable cost; for the London 
Rothschilds, maintaining commitments in Hungary resulted in costs that were to be 
measured in personal as well as in financial terms. The Standstill Agreement 
between the London creditors and the Hungarian debtors was renewed annually in 
the course of the 1930s; likewise, the Hungarian Treasury Bills were periodically 
renewed by the bondholders. As foreign transfers were stopped, the creditors were 
forced to accept payment via blocked, pengő accounts which were of virtually no 
value.  
 
The hopes for political and economic reconstruction, which had been entertained in 
the City before the Financial Crisis, faded rapidly as the international political 
situation deteriorated with the rise of the European dictatorships. N M Rothschild & 
Sons appears to have conducted very little, if any, new business with Hungary. In 
discussing the Hungarian Standstill with Anthony de Rothschild, Montagu Norman 
revealed the extent of his disappointment. The Governor was very disturbed by how 
Hungary was becoming pro-German and pro-Italian, and also hostile to Britain 
because of the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations against Italy. Norman 
admitted that the political situation had completely prevented the favourable 
developments which he had anticipated and he did not know what could be done.68 
Such feelings of optimism turning to bleak pessimism must have been shared in no 
small measure by those at New Court. Even greater challenges lay ahead, with the 
coming of war in Europe. But the house of Rothschild in London survived. If family-
related factors were partly responsible for creating problems for the bank, perhaps 
less tangible qualities of conviction and resilience should also be counted among this 
particular family’s characteristics. 
 
 
Neil Forbes       Coventry University 
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